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Thank you so much to the Reckless and Dinitz families for creating and 
supporting this wonderful lecture series, and to Ryan King, Dana Haynie, and 
everyone here at the Criminal Justice Center and the Moritz College of Law for this 
invitation and for being so welcoming.  I am truly honored to be invited to give the 
Reckless-Dinitz lecture and humbled by the slate of scholars who have come before 
me at this podium.  And I am even more humbled when I look around the room to 
see so many colleagues whose work has had such an impact on our fields, and whose 
work has been incredibly influential on my own.  
Before I begin my talk, I’d like to just say a few words about Professor C. 
Ronald Huff’s passing just a few short weeks ago.  As you know, this was going to 
be a bit of a double-bill, with Ron up here to commemorate this lecture series on its 
30th annual offering.  He had helped found the lecture series, honoring two of his 
esteemed mentors and colleagues—Walter Reckless and Simon Dinitz—when he 
was Director of the John Glenn College here.  He was so excited to be coming back 
to Columbus for this event, and even after he had to cancel his travel plans, he was 
still enthusiastically working up his comments about how important this lecture 
series was to him.  
Ron loved UC Irvine, his last academic home.  But I always suspected that he 
loved Ohio State even more.  We all had our own ways of teasing him when he’d 
pull out Ohio State as the shining example of how things could or should be done.  
My personal favorite rib was, “Do you mean THE Ohio State University, Ron?” 
He’d just laugh.  Ultimately, Ron loved the intellectual enterprise and community 
of students and scholars that comes with university life, whether in Columbus, Ohio 
or Irvine, California.  And that community loved him back.  He will be sorely missed 
by so many.  And with that, I’d like to dedicate this talk to our shared colleague, 
Ron Huff.  
And now, I am going to ask that you indulge me as I talk through my decade 
long obsession with the federal criminal system.  My motivating questions for this 
                                                                                                                            
   Professor and Chair, Department of Criminology, Law & Society and Professor, School of 
Law (by courtesy), University of California, Irvine.  This article is a revised version of the 30th annual 
Walter C. Reckless-Simon Dinitz Memorial Lecture, delivered by Mona Lynch at The Ohio State 
University on April 18, 2019.  The research described in this article was supported by grants awarded 
by the National Science Foundation, grant nos. 1251700 & 1849089, a grant awarded by the Russell 
Sage Foundation, award no. 93-18-03, and a grant awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office 
of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, grant no. 2010-IJ-CX-0010.  Points of view in this 
document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the 
U.S. Department of Justice.  
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talk—and for the underlying research that I have conducted on the federal system—
are:   
 
• How is the power of criminal law mobilized—and resisted—in 
varied, creative ways by legal actors?  
• How do those variations manifest as local norms and practices that 
transcend individual actors and moments in time?   
• Finally, and perhaps most critically, how does this “live” version of 
the law produce and maintain inequalities that formal law & policy 
explicitly aim to eliminate?  
 
As many scholars before me have insightfully highlighted,1 the critical policy 
change in the federal system was the introduction of a rigid guidelines sentencing 
regime in the 1980s, replacing a highly discretionary system that was said to produce 
extreme variations in outcomes, including troubling patterns of bias.2  The story of 
the federal sentencing guidelines’ inception and initial development exemplifies the 
gap between an idealized version of law and policy and the realities of “law in 
action.”  It reveals the irreconcilable tension between rules as imagined in an abstract 
form, and rules as practiced by living, breathing, motivated actors.  The legislation 
that authorized the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s establishment (and that defined 
its mission) set a high bar for the reforms that were to come.  In particular, the 
Commission was directed to establish policy that would, among other things 
“Provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.”3 
The Commission spent about 3 years constructing a system of rules governing 
criminal sentencing to accomplish that goal.  These rules were promulgated in the 
federal sentencing “Guidelines Manual” and put into practice in 1987.4  The 
guidelines, as devised, essentially reduced relevant sentencing considerations to two 
things: past and present criminal offending by the defendant.  In the process, a 
                                                                                                                            
1   For example, see KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998); For an account of some of the design 
weaknesses in the federal guideline system, see Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of 
Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93 
(1999).  
2   The most influential critique was mounted by federal judge Marvin E. Frankel, especially as 
articulated in his 1972 book, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (Hill and Wang Pub. 1974).  
For the legislative developments following from its publication, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The 
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). 
3   Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1837 (enacted Oct. 
12, 1984). 
4   Brent Evan Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States 
Sentencing Commission, 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167 (2017). 
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number of traditional sentencing factors were excised from the calculation: things 
like the defendant’s family ties and responsibilities, mental and emotional condition, 
age, employment history, and so on.5  
This narrowing of what could be considered, coupled with the intricate 
quantification system, was designed to tame and constrain the sentencing discretion 
of judges, which was seen by many as contributing to caprice and bias in outcomes.6  
Based on the system the Commission devised, a defendant will fall into one of 258 
intersections of offense level by criminal history category on the sentencing table 
grid that specifies the guidelines sentence range.7  
The application of the new guideline system was mandatory in its original 
design, allowing only limited exceptions for judicial deviations from the prescribed 
ranges.  While this changed in 2005, when the Supreme Court rendered the 
Guidelines advisory in U.S. v. Booker, they must still be calculated and considered 
in determining all sentences.8  And they remain a focal point at sentencing, in effect, 
anchoring the final determination.9 
The Commission also built in some controls over legal actors in an effort to 
prevent end-runs around the system, including requiring the calculation of all crime-
related “relevant conduct” even if not part of the conviction, and a robust appeals 
mechanism if judges deviated from the guidelines.  The Commission appeared to 
operate with an immense amount of faith that it could tame and regulate the human 
relations—including the power relations—that constitute institutional operations.10 
Yet, despite the incredible brainpower, institutional resources, and time 
devoted to developing and revising the Guidelines, they could never really approach 
the ideal of achieving uniformity in outcomes.  Judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, 
                                                                                                                            
5   Mona Lynch & Alyse Bertenthal, The Calculus of the Record: Criminal History in the 
Making of U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 145 (2016). 
6   Id.  
7   U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL CH. 5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  
8   United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  In Booker, the United States Supreme Court 
rendered the Guidelines “effectively advisory,” giving federal judges the discretion to impose a non-
Guidelines sentence as long as it is consistent with the broad purposes of punishment.  Id. at 245.  Two 
years later, the Court ruled in Kimbrough v. United States that judges are free to sentence outside of 
the prescribed Guidelines’ range on the grounds of policy disagreements with the Guidelines.  522 U.S. 
85 (2007).  In Gall v. United States, decided at the same time as Kimbrough, the Court mandated 
deference to sentencing judges’ decisions and authorized judges to use individualized assessments of 
cases and offenders in deciding whether and how to depart from the Guidelines.  Mandatory minimums 
are still in force, though, so in cases in which both Guidelines and mandatory minimums apply, the 
mandatory minimum “trumps.” 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
9   Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in 
Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014). 
10  Mona Lynch, The Narrative of the Number: Quantification in Criminal Court, 44 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 31, 35–36 (2019).  
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and other front-line legal actors were active agents who would resist being reduced 
to “automatons” under the new system.11  
And this was indeed what happened.  Early studies of the guidelines-in-action 
by Stephen Shulhofer and Ilene Nagel systematically chronicled the “guideline 
circumvention” that was happening in practice after the implementation of the 
guidelines.12  They identified the case types that were likely to prompt 
circumvention; the methods by which circumvention was achieved; and how legal 
actors created the illusion of formal compliance with the guidelines despite 
circumvention.  
Subsequent research documented continued, “unwarranted” disparities in 
sentence outcomes as well: by demographic features of defendants such as race, 
ethnicity, and gender; and by locale.  The first wave of the disparities research 
primarily measured differences in imposed sentence lengths for those with equal 
culpability according to the guidelines—while controlling for “legal” factors such 
as breaks for substantial assistance and reductions for “acceptance of 
responsibility.”13  More recent quantitative work has also recognized that looking 
only at the gaps between guideline calculations and actual imposed sentence may 
miss where much discretionary action happens.  That is, in pre-sentencing processes 
where prosecutors’ arsenal of tools remained relatively unregulated by the 
guidelines regime.14   
                                                                                                                            
11  Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO 
ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 523 (2007); Joachim J. Savelsberg, Law That Does Not Fit Society: Sentencing 
Guidelines as a Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of Substantivized Law, 97 AM. J. OF SOC. 1346 
(1992). 
12  Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. L. REV. 
1284 (1997); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of 
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
501 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (1989). 
13  For studies that examine the role of defendant demographic characteristics on variations in 
sentencing outcomes, see generally, e.g., Jill K. Doerner & Stephen Demuth, The Independent and 
Joint Effects of Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Age on Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts, 27 
JUST. Q. 1 (2010); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen DeMuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in 
U.S. Federal Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly? 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705 (2000).  For studies that 
examine the impact of jurisdiction on variations in sentencing outcomes, see generally, e.g., Paula 
Kautt, Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation in Sentencing Outcomes 
for Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633 (2002); Cassia Spohn, Sentencing Decisions in 
Three US District Courts: Testing the Assumption of Uniformity in the Federal Sentencing Process, 7 
JUST. RES. & POL’Y 1, (2005); JawJeong Wu & Cassia Spohn, Interdistrict Disparity in Sentencing in 
Three U.S. District Courts, 56 CRIME & DELINQ. 290 (2010). 
14  See generally Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.  729 (2012); Brian D. Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guidelines 
Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); Marit Rehavi & 
Sonja Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320 (2014); Lauren 
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It’s about here that I enter the empirical research scene.  I was trained by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission’s research staff at a joint National Institute of Justice-
ICPSR summer methods workshop at the University of Michigan nearly a decade 
ago.15  And I made my first foray into data analysis using the Commission’s massive, 
detailed sentencing data over the next couple of years.  
My first empirical deep-dive looked at how the move from a mandatory to an 
advisory guidelines system after the Booker decision impacted sentencing processes 
and outcomes.  I suspected that the on-the-ground plea negotiation and sentencing 
practices likely shifted with the legal policy changes, but that the orientation of front-
line legal actors would be toward maintaining outcome norms for given types of 
cases.  Put simply, I assumed there would be localized norms that would temper 
dramatic changes in punishment outcomes, despite changes to the formal rules.  
In that sense, I expected to find that districts would maintain some stability over 
time in regard to sentence norms, but that the way legal actors got to those sentences 
would change as a function of the formal rules that structured their daily practice.  
My first study, with my then-graduate student (now professor), Marisa Omori, was 
isolated to drug trafficking cases,16 a focus I have largely maintained in subsequent 
research.  
One advantage of focusing on drugs (as opposed to other offense categories) 
was that a substantial proportion of drug cases are subject to mandatory minimum 
statutes, which from a conceptual standpoint added an interesting twist to how drug 
cases would be charged and negotiated in the post-Booker era.  
In our first study, we asked several research questions: 
 
1). Do within-district sentencing patterns demonstrate stability across 
different policy periods, indicating the influence of local norms? 
2)  Are the mechanisms for getting to sentence outcomes changing in 
response to legal policy reforms, such as those brought by Booker? 
3)  Are cases that are not subject to mandatory minimums more likely to 
vary from the guidelines compared to those that are subject to them? 
 
One of our primary ways of measuring sentence outcomes was a ratio measure 
of actual imposed sentence over the calculated guideline minimum sentences.  In 
drug cases, actual drug sentences imposed bounced around 85% of the guideline 
minimum over the period we were studying.  
 
                                                                                                                            
Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Charging Decisions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394 (2010).  
15  ICPSR SUMMER PROGRAM IN QUANTITATIVE METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/sumprog/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019). 
16  Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Legal Change and Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker: 
The Impact of Time and Place on Drug Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 411 
(2014) [hereinafter Legal Change and Sentencing Norms]. 
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This alone suggests a gap between perceived “just” sentences in drug cases by 
those in the trenches, and what the Commission had devised as guideline-compliant 
sentences (drug sentences were unfortunately anchored to draconian drug mandatory 
minimums in the guideline formulation).  In other words, mandatory guidelines or 
not, there appeared to be consistent downward pressure on drug sentences in practice 
across policy periods.  
So what specifically did we find in answer to our questions?  
 
1)  Yes, we found that districts tend to look like themselves over time, 
supporting the hypothesis that local norms about outcomes shape 
legal strategy and process.  Prevailing local norms appeared to exert 
more pressure in districts with larger caseloads and greater caseload 
pressure (as a rate per judge), so those districts had more stability over 
time and across policy periods than did districts with smaller 
caseloads and less caseload pressure.  
2)  Yes, there was some indication of changing mechanisms, especially 
relative to the very restrictive PROTECT ACT period right before 
Booker, when the mandatory guidelines regime was at its most 
binding and constraining on judicial discretion.17  In particular, 
prosecutors appeared to use more mandatory minimums as a way of 
constraining judicial discretion when the guidelines were less 
binding, and especially after they were no longer mandatory.  By the 
final period we studied, prosecutors filed 25% more mandatory 
                                                                                                                            
17  The Feeney Amendment of the 2003 PROTECT Act further restricted judges’ ability to 
depart downward from the guidelines under the mandatory guidelines regime, and substituted de novo 
appellate review for the abuse-of-discretion standard that was in place.  See Stephanos Bibas, The 
Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
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minimum-eligible drug cases than they had in the period right before 
Booker.  
3)  No, cases not subject to mandatory minimums were not more likely 
to vary from guideline minimums.  In fact, cases subject to mandatory 
minimums demonstrated more downward variance from the 
guidelines than in those without mandatory minimums across all time 
periods, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Specifically, over the entire period 
of study, drug cases subject to mandatory minimums were sentenced 
to 83% of the guideline minimum whereas those not subject to 
mandatory minimums were sentenced to 92% of the guideline 
minimum. 
 




Finally, we found relatively large regional differences in sentence outcomes 
across policy periods.  Districts in the South consistently meted out the longest drug 
sentences, which were also closest to the guideline minimum, whereas sentences in 
the Northeast were consistently the lowest in length and as a percentage of guideline 
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This work just piqued my interest, in part because by doing the quantitative 
work I realized how many of the kinds of process questions I wanted to ask could 
NOT be answered by moving backward from punishment outcomes.  I wanted to 
dig in deeper to see how case selection, plea negotiation, and sentencing practices 
actually happened in different districts.  So I embarked on a comparative qualitative 
field research project to do just that.  
After having many doors shut in my face, I was finally able to gain access to 
the federal system, entering through the federal defenders.  I was embedded in 
federal defenders’ offices in four very distinct districts for multiple weeks-long 
stretches over a two-year period.  Part of my agreement with the attorneys in each 
office was that I not identify the district.  Therefore, I labeled each by their 
geographic characteristics: Northeastern, Southeast, Southwestern, and Rural.  
Through that access, I became a court-watcher, a fly on the wall, and an 
inquisitor.  I had the cooperation of the attorneys and investigators within each 
defender’s office, and I also networked in each district to get interviews with legal 
actors outside of those offices (mainly assistant U.S. Attorneys and some judges).   
As soon as I completed this work, I realized how much I hadn’t known when I 
started.  It was fascinating, exhausting, infuriating, and depressing.  Each district 
                                                                                                                            
18  This table is reproduced from Mona Lynch, 94 Different Countries?  Time, Place, and 
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that I went to was its own world (as were each of the divisions within the districts).  
While those working in each had a sense of differences between their court and 
others, their day-to-day practices were nonetheless governed by local norms.  
Those norms extended beyond just shaping sentence outcomes.  They included 
everything from the vernacular to describe things like change-of-plea hearings and 
sentencing memos, to how things like substantial assistance departures were 
quantified (either a percentage of time, or in actual time, or even in guideline levels 
off), to norms around plea agreements and whether they were binding or not, and so 
on.  
In my interviews, I also explored how legal practice had transformed over time 
as a consequence of various policy changes.  In a set of interviews with long-time 
legal actors, I discovered a much more nuanced, complex, and strategic account of 
how attorneys and judges adapted to the Booker mandates.19  Booker seemed to 
impact the day-to-day business at all stages of criminal process: charging, plea 
negotiations, and formal sentencing.   
Indeed, I confirmed through my interviews that prosecutors did, in some kinds 
of cases, consciously use mandatory statutes in all sorts of creative ways to cabin 
judicial discretion.  In some cases, they formally charged and sought convictions 
that invoked mandatories as a way to impose a sentencing floor on judges.  For 
example, in child pornography cases where identical conduct could usually be 
charged as either possession (which does not have a mandatory minimum) or receipt 
(which has a 5-year mandatory minimum), prosecutors would sometimes charge the 
receipt to prevent a sympathetic judge from having the discretion to sentence below 
that minimum.  
But more often, threats of filings—of things like the 851 mandatory 
enhancement for prior drug conviction,20 the 924c gun enhancement that added a 
hefty consecutive mandatory minimum, and the child pornography receipt 
mandatory minimum—were used by prosecutors as bargaining chips to get to a 
desired plea agreement.  These uses would not necessarily show up in the formal 
sentencing data, however, so their impact is not measurable in the standard way 
researchers have examined the Booker impact.  
There was also much more bargaining in the shadow of the judge after Booker, 
as judicial assignment took on more importance under advisory guidelines.  When 
                                                                                                                            
19  An analysis of the interviews on the policy change question is reported in Mona Lynch, 
Booker Circumvention?  Adjudication Strategies in the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Era, 43 N.Y.U. 
REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 59 (2019).   
20  This refers to 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2012), which was authorized by a provision of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 requiring prosecutors to file an 
information indicating that they were seeking prior conviction enhancements and provide evidence of 
the prior conviction.  This filing only applies to drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841, and until 
December 2018 triggered a doubling of the mandatory minimum where there is one eligible drug prior, 
and a life without parole sentence where the mandatory minimum was 10 years and two or more eligible 
drug priors are present.  The First Step Act, infra note 33, enacted in December 2018, modified those 
enhancements for convictions subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum.   
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defense attorneys were assigned judges they viewed as favorable, they could get 
much better soft or hard binding agreements with prosecutors.  When the judge was 
more of a “guidelines” judge, prosecutors had even more of the upper hand in 
negotiations and did not need to make many concessions at all.  
These strategies differed by district, and new norms appeared to have developed 
over time under the “new normal” of advisory guidelines.  What these findings 
suggest is that any analysis of outcome data should not simply attribute post-Booker 
changes in sentencing outcomes to re-empowered judges.  Rather, the changed rules 
opened up new modes of case settlement that are still hugely influenced (to varying 
degrees based on case types and locale) by prosecutors.  
What I came away with from this work is that the question of how legal and 
policy change impacts outcomes is exceedingly more complex, dynamic, multi-
varied, and fascinating than any straight policy impact study can tell us.  Individuals 
matter, place matters, rules of the game matter, and these things swirl and interact 
and transform in all kinds of ways, both predictable and unpredictable.  
I’ve now spent considerable time talking through at least parts of the answers 
to the first two questions that I initially posed regarding how law is mobilized in 
practice, and how those variations in mobilization manifest as more enduring local 
norms.   
I want to spend the remainder of my time building on that foundation to grapple 
with the final, and I think most important question that I posed.  That is, how does 
the living version of the law that I have described produce and maintain inequalities 
that the formal law & policy that transformed federal sentencing in the 1980s had 
explicitly aimed to eliminate?  
As previously noted, empirical research conducted after the guidelines were 
implemented indicates that various kinds of demographic disparities—including by 
race and ethnicity—have persisted in sentencing outcomes despite the 
Commission’s stated goal of ameliorating them.21  
 
  
                                                                                                                            
21  Jeffery S. Nowacki, An Intersectional Approach to Race/Ethnicity, Sex, and Age Disparity 
in Federal Sentencing Outcomes: An Examination of Policy Across Time Periods, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIM. JUST. 97 (2016) 
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Figure 4: Drug Sentences as % of Guideline Minimum x Race over Time 
 
 
In regards to drug cases, white drug defendants have been advantaged at 
sentencing relative to drug defendants of color across policy periods, even when 
controlling for criminal history and offense level, as illustrated in Figure 4.22  It is 
also the case that many, many more persons of color have been federally convicted 
and punished for drug crimes—in absolute numbers, and relative to whites—since 
the guidelines regime was put into practice.23  
What do these two facts tell us about the problem of bias in the federal system?  
It turns out that the second one tells us at least as much as the first.  
As I suggested earlier, the standard empirical approach to studying disparities 
in the federal system is too often focused on the wrong thing.  It typically examines 
whether various “extra-legal” disparities are evident in actual sentence outcomes, 
relative to the calculated guideline sentence.24  That kind of test, of course, implicitly 
assumes that all things leading up to and going into the guideline calculation are not 
biased.  
                                                                                                                            
22  Legal Change and Sentencing Norms, supra note 16. 
23  See for instance U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 114 (2004) (pointing out that although the majority of federally sentenced 
defendants “in the preguidelines era were White, minorities dominate the federal criminal docket 
today.”). 
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Moreover, findings of disparity are typically theorized as the product of 
individual decision-makers’ cognitive processes, such that, for example, judges may 
rely upon stereotypes, or implicit or explicit biases that they may hold about different 
groups to produce these differences.25  I was skeptical of this approach—both 
empirically and conceptually, when I embarked on this line of research.  Once I 
conducted the comparative fieldwork, I was convinced it was wrong.  
The most profound insight I derived from my fieldwork was about the systemic 
way that the federal criminal system produces and maintains racial inequality 
through its discretionary, front-end legal processes.  Here, too, there were 
considerable local variations in what that looked like, but the disproportionate 
impact transcended locale.  
My first take on this was published in a book, Hard Bargains, where I tried to 
analytically capture these processes for federal drug cases in three of my four 
districts.26  In two of the districts I profiled, Northeastern and Southeast, the earliest-
stage processes—the decisions to arrest and then federally indict—were precisely 
where bias was largely produced.  In urban divisions in both districts, 1990s gun and 
violence prevention programs were the inception point, both historically and 
procedurally.  Local and federal law enforcement agencies came together to wield 
the punitive federal drug and gun laws in selected neighborhoods to address the 
problem of violence.  
In Northeastern, there was an early commitment to NOT use the federal drug 
laws as a pretext to ensnare those they suspected of gun violence, but that 
commitment faded over time.  And long after the federal funding dried up for the 
anti-violence initiative, federal agents, AUSAs, and local police continued to work 
together to target those deemed gang members and general “troublemakers” by 
setting them up in very small, hand-to-hand drug buy-busts.  
The arrest strategies were also forward-looking to sentencing; so had 
consequences for that end-stage.  A favored strategy was to set up buys in protected 
zones (near schools, public housing, and parks) to trigger a short mandatory 
minimum and an increased supervised release period.  Those so targeted in these 
kinds of operations were nearly always young, African-American or sometimes 
Latino men, who often had drug priors that would potentially enhance their sentence.  
While there was a practice in this district of targeting more traditional, multi-level 
drug conspiracies as well, these little street cases constituted the majority share of 
the drug caseload.  
A 1990s anti-violence joint taskforce initiative was also launched in Southeast 
district.  But this one specifically targeted crack dealers in public housing 
developments where the residents were primarily African-American.  There, law 
enforcement essentially went after everyone involved in the crack trade under the 
anti-violence banner —even those selling single rocks or serving as mere lookouts.  
                                                                                                                            
25  Id.  
26  MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT 
(2016).  
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There was a particularly aggressive effort to get low-level dealers to cross the 5-
gram line to trigger the 5-year mandatory minimum that came with such crack 
convictions (an option that disappeared after the 2010 passage of the Fair Sentencing 
Act).27 
Federal law enforcement, including the U.S. Attorney’s office, was notoriously 
aggressive during and after this initiative, topping the nation in the number of federal 
crack prosecutions and rivaling top-status in severity of sentences meted out in those 
cases.  Nearly everyone federally charged through this practice was African-
American.  And again, long after the violence initiative ended, the aggressive, 
proactive drug law enforcement lived on.  In this district, as well, a premium was 
placed on federally charging even small-time street dealers when they had predicate 
convictions that could make them eligible for enhanced sentences.  Doing so 
enhanced plea negotiation power for prosecutors.  
Law enforcement and prosecutors in this district also cultivated an 
exceptionally widespread and insidious confidential informant practice, so much so 
that all standard drug plea agreements included a provision that defendants inform.  
The informant networks hit close to home—family and friends being pushed to turn 
on each other, typically resulting in same-race production of new drug defendants.  
Defendants who tried to opt out of informing were generally punished with various 
enhancements, like the 851 drug prior enhancement, if they were eligible.  
In the third district I profiled in the book, Southwestern, the pattern was quite 
different but nonetheless unsettling.  The district has among the highest volume of 
cases overall in the nation, including of drug cases.  Nine out of ten drug defendants 
here were Latino, who more often than not entered the criminal system after being 
caught up in the border control regime in the district.  
No matter the kind of bust, illicit substance, or mode of transport, the vast 
majority of drug defendants here were low-level couriers with no meaningful 
financial stake in the drug trafficking.  As I describe in the book and in other writing, 
drug cases here were typically managed through the lens of immigration 
enforcement.   
For undocumented defendants and even non-citizens with legal status, the 
overriding goal of both prosecutors and judges was crafting an outcome that would 
ensure removal after sentence completion, the elimination of any future possibility 
of legal entry into the country, and more severe punishment the next time around.  
Nearly untouched in all of this were the cartels, who profited from the drug trade 
and whose operations all-too-often trapped people into taking the risk of becoming 
couriers.  
                                                                                                                            
27  The Fair Sentencing Act reduced the so-called “100–1” powder-crack cocaine quantity 
disparity to trigger the same mandatory sentence to 18–1, and mandatory minimums for simple 
possession of crack were eliminated.  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, §§ 2, 3, 124 
Stat. 2372 (2010). 
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Ultimately, my field research confirmed what legal scholars have told us for 
years—that the relatively unregulated prosecutorial power in charging and plea 
bargaining is where injustices are easily and readily produced.28  
In my study, it was clear that U.S. Attorneys’ ultra-discretionary use of 
charging power in regard to drug offenses, coupled with the ability to wield the 
incredibly punitive elements of statutes and guidelines in those cases during plea 
negotiations, was the engine of inequality in each district.  At least with drug 
prosecutions, case selection was the single biggest driver of inequality, not only in 
the demographics of who was being charged, but in ultimate punishment outcomes 
given the sentencing strategies built into the process from the investigative stage 
onward.29  Indeed, my field research really brought home for me how tightly 
intertwined legal behavior—as in choices made in proactively producing, then 
prosecuting cases—is with systemic inequality in the system.  
After that project, I went back to the sentencing commission data with bold, 
new ideas about how we might better uncover and assess racial inequality.  In 
particular, I wanted to examine patterns over time around crack prosecutions, given 
their notorious role in producing racial inequality in the federal system.  
I went back to my collaborator, Marisa Omori, and we endeavored to 
reconfigure how to measure inequality.  We rejected the individual-level approach 
that imagines bias in institutions resulting solely from the aberrational acts of 
individual bad actors, and we tried to better capture how the mobilization of criminal 
law itself produces inequalities, especially in the early stages of the process.  
So we posed a question that came straight out of the lessons from my research.  
That is, “Do districts that aggressively prosecute crack cases demonstrate higher 
rates of black-white conviction-rate inequality across all case types compared to 
those districts with less aggressive crack prosecution practices?”30  
We used eleven years of federal court outcome data, coupled with data from 
the U.S. Attorney’s office and additional data sources, and we aggregated the data 
to the district court level to answer the question.  We operationalized our 
independent variable, “aggressive prosecutions” as: 1) the relative share of drug 
caseload composed of crack cases; 2) prosecution of lower level cases (by median 
                                                                                                                            
28  Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Mona Lynch, Institutionalizing Bias: The Death Penalty, Federal Drug 
Prosecutions, and Mechanisms of Disparate Punishment, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91 (2013).  See generally, 
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative 
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–884 (2009), in regard to the dangers inherent in contemporary 
prosecutorial power.  
29  Using both observational and interview data, I also address the issue of how charging 
practices contribute to inequality in all four of my field sites in Mona Lynch, Prosecutorial Discretion, 
Drug Case Selection, and Inequality in Federal Court, 35 JUST. Q. 1309 (2018).  
30  This work is reported in Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Crack as Proxy: Aggressive Federal 
Drug Prosecutions and the Production of Black-White Racial Inequality, 52 L. & SOC’Y REV. 773 
(2018).  
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crack drug weight in cases); 3) higher rates of crack defendants eligible for the safety 
valve; and 4) the relative use of several legal punishment enhancement tools.  
Our conviction rate measure (our outcome measure) was designed to capture a 
combination of case selection and pre-sentence processes.  We calculated the rate of 
white defendants convicted in federal court relative to the white population in the 
district and the rate of black defendants convicted in federal court relative to the 
black population across all cases.  
We ran multiple regression models that included crack cases in the outcome 
measure to capture the direct effect of crack cases on inequality, and then we 
removed crack cases to assess the spillover effect on the rest of the criminal 
caseloads.  We included several proxy variables to control for relative crack usage 
in each district, among a number of other controls.    
Our hypothesis was confirmed.  In particular, the share of crack cases 
prosecuted in a district in any given year predicted the degree of racial 
disproportionality in conviction rates for all criminal defendants.  Put simply, the 
more crack cases, the more likely that blacks, relative to whites, were prosecuted 
and convicted in the district.  
 




As illustrated in the left graph of Figure 5, the rate of inequality nearly doubled 
from the lowest to highest crack-prosecuting districts.  It may seem like common 
sense to predict that crack prosecutions would directly contribute to inequality in 
who is charged and convicted in federal court, given that the federal crack war was 
infamously disproportionately waged against African-American defendants 
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(although I should note that in any given district-year, the data reflected the full 
range, from 0-100% of crack defendants being black).31  
But even when we removed crack cases from our measures of inequality, crack 
prosecutions were still significantly associated with racially unequal criminal justice 
outcomes for all other kinds of cases.  As illustrated in the right graph, black-white 
inequality grew by more than 20% as a function of crack prosecution rates.   
This finding of a “spillover effect” suggested to us that aggressive crack 
prosecutions may operate as the proverbial canary in a coalmine, signaling broader 
institutional bias where they prevail.  It also brought home one point I’ve tried to 
make clear in this talk—that inequality in legal systems is not simply the product of 
aberrational, individual bias of those who do not adhere to the rules.  Rather, the 
rules themselves provide opportunities to produce systemic bias through their lawful 
application.  In this case, the crack laws (and the sentencing provisions that attend 
them), which prosecutors can use within their lawful discretion in a tempered or 
profligate manner, are a direct mechanism for producing inequality.  
I want to end by thinking through varied forms of inequality in federal courts 
that seem to be emerging under the current administration (and, no, the First Step 
Act32 does not wipe out my trepidation).  
Before his departure as Attorney General, Jeff Sessions essentially declared a 
stepped-up war on the kinds of crimes that have been the most subject to racially 
disparate enforcement in the federal system—drugs, immigration, gangs, guns—and 
then he devised a set of policies to wage that war.  Early in his tenure, Sessions 
directed federal prosecutors to prioritize “illegal immigration and violent crime, 
such as drug trafficking, gang violence, and gun crimes.”33  A few months later, he 
issued a memorandum that laid out prosecutorial policy that, among other things, 
rescinded the Holder policy on more parsimonious use of drug mandatory 
minimums.34  In 2018, he announced a “zero-tolerance” policy on illegal entry, 
requiring prosecutors in border districts to file criminal charges against all those 
suspected of attempted or completed undocumented entry into the U.S. and 
                                                                                                                            
31  See generally, DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 
(2007).  See also, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 1995 Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing 
Policy, at 154 (1995), https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/1995-report-congress-
cocaine-and-federal-sentencing-policy; U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2007 Report to the Congress: Cocaine 
and Federal Sentencing Policy (2007), https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2007-
report-congress-cocaine-and-federal-sentencing-policy; U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Report to the Congress: 
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (2007) available at: http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_
and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_
Sentencing_Policy.pdf. 
32  First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115–391, 132 Stat. 5194. 
33  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Aff., Att’y Gen. Sessions Directs Fed. 
Prosecutors to Target Most Significant Violent Offenders (Mar. 8, 2017), in JUSTICE NEWS, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-directs-federal-prosecutors-target-most-
significant-violent [https://perma.cc/6VBE-SF27]. 
34  See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/7WQP-6NUZ]. 
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encouraging the aggressive use of various criminal statutes in immigration cases.35  
Since Sessions’ departure, there is no sign from the Department of Justice that these 
initiatives are being put on hold or rescinded.  
And while it is still too early to fully assess how these policies have impacted 
case characteristics and outcomes, we are starting to get glimpses of how the federal 
criminal system is operating under this renewed war.  The indications are that the 
new tough-on-crime policies are indeed over-targeting non-whites with some 
potentially harmful impacts.  
I am back in the field in my four districts, doing a sort of Hard Bargains 
redux and I am extending the longitudinal case outcome dataset to see how these 
new politics and policies are trickling down into legal practice and actual case 
outcomes.  While I cannot draw too many conclusions yet, suffice it to say that it is 
equally fascinating, and even more infuriating and depressing this time around.  
What I am seeing converges with anecdotes I am hearing from a number of 
districts.  
Along the Southwest border, for instance, the zero-tolerance prosecutorial 
policy in regard to undocumented immigrants appears to have had the perverse 
effect of decreasing serious crime prosecutions, including of the very kinds of 
crimes that Sessions had publicly declared to be priorities, such as large-scale drug 
trafficking.  The assembly line of immigration prosecutions has simply swallowed 
up resources.  
There also appears to be a racial bifurcation as to who’s being charged in 
federal court in response to the current opioid epidemic.  This is not surprising 
given the administration’s rhetoric36 (backed up by a Sessions’ memo)37 that has 
called for the death penalty for opioid dealers where death results.  The targets in 
this rhetoric have been portrayed by the administration in the most vile, racialized 
ways.  In my Southeast district, for instance, I’ve observed that whites are 
disproportionately likely to be treated as the “victims” of the epidemic, and 
aggressive federal prosecution of persons of color who deal in even small amounts 
of opioids is the response.  
The war on immigration has spawned some other troubling practices.  In my 
Northeast district, the aggravated identity theft mandatory minimum (it is a 2-year 
consecutive add-on to the base sentence) is now being regularly used against 
undocumented immigrants who have used others’ social security numbers for 
                                                                                                                            
35  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, The Attorney General 
Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), in JUSTICE NEWS, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-
entry [https://perma.cc/3FPN-47YR]. 
36  Remarks by President Trump on Combatting the Opioid Crisis, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 19, 
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-combatting-opioid
-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/E4HM-KPHJ]. 
37  Memorandum from Atty’ Gen. Jeff Sessions to U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Use of Cap. 
Punishment in Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/
1045036/download [https://perma.cc/4WSN-CW4P]. 
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employment.  This was one of Sessions’ suggested practices, being taken up 
differentially around the country. 
These anecdotal observations from the current regime may well portend the 
return to the discriminatory, exceptionally punitive practices that characterized the 
worst of the late-20th century “war on crime.”  However, as my own and others’ 
research has demonstrated, this renewed war will be waged with different 
intensities and will have distinct contours as a function of local legal norms and 
social relations.  
What that means for efforts aiming to mitigate the racially harmful impacts of 
the criminal system is that it is not enough to just reform formal law and policy.  
We need to be vigilant to the myriad ways that law takes form as localized action, 
and encourage efforts at the local level to intervene where harms are produced.  
Thank you. 
